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1Abstract
We use a spatially-explicit analytical framework to compare mandatory refuges and
a tax on the resistant variety as regulation instruments for pest resistance management.
Because the extraction of the common-pool pest susceptibility resource depends on the
spatial pattern of pest dispersal, we ￿nd that the usual preference for market-based
environmental instruments does not necessarily apply to pest resistance management.
Mandatory refuges are preferred to a tax on the resistant variety for some assumption
sets on heterogeneity between farms and pest dispersal distances.
1 Introduction
More than 20% of genetically-modi￿ed crops currently grown are insect-resistant through
the expression of insecticidal proteins of Bacillus thuringiensis (Bt). The evolution of
insect pest resistance will imperil the e￿ciency of these transgenic insect-resistant crops.
The currently advised strategy to delay resistance evolution is to require Bt growers to
plant non-Bt refuges in close proximity to Bt plants and to control their compliance with
this requirement (see Hurley et al. 2001 and 2002, Mitchell et al. 2002). We suggest
that an alternative strategy to induce growers to plant non-toxic crops is to make Bt
seed more expensive by instituting a user fee.
Pest management in agricultural production by use of chemical pesticides or pest-
resistant varieties (e.g. Bt crops) exerts a selection pressure on pest populations. Over
time, the ability of chemicals or resistant varieties to prevent crop damages decreases as
resistance to these pesticides by the pests increases. In economic terms, the stock of pest
susceptibility to a given pesticide is a non-renewable resource (Hueth and Regev 1974).
Farmers might use pest resistance strategies to exhaust this resource (pest susceptibility)
at an e￿cient rate. For instance, they might devote part of their crop to conventional
varieties (or without pesticide), thereby creating refuges for pests. Yet, since pest are
mobile from one crop to another, pest susceptibility is a common-pool resource for
farmers. Since farmers bear the full cost of reducing growth of pest susceptibility but
share the bene￿ts, they have an incentive to under-invest in pest resistance management
strategies. As a consequence, farmers tends to exhaust the stock of susceptibility at a
higher rate than the optimal rate. In other words, the laissez-faire management of pest
susceptibility leads to the famous tragedy of the commons, thereby providing a rationale
for regulation (Regev et al. 1983).
In this paper we contribute to the economic literature on pest resistance management
2by taking explicitly into account farm localisation and pest dispersion to examine the
choice of regulation instruments for pest resistance management. More precisely, we
compare two regulatory instruments: (uniform) mandatory refuges and a tax/subsidy
scheme (a tax on resistant varieties and a subsidy on conventional varieties). Mandatory
refuges have been implemented in the U.S. for Bt corn through the so-called insect
resistance management plan. Taxes and subsidies might provide farmers with incentives
to plant more of the conventional variety, thereby reducing pest resistance evolution.
Vacher et al. (2006) used simulations to compare these two instruments in a spatially-
explicit, population genetics model of Bt corn in the United States. Their approach con-
veys the usual advantages and limitations of simulation models, i.e. careful calibration
to real-world data, versus lack of generality and lack of transparency in the mechanisms.
To get additional insights into this problem, we build a spatially-explicit framework with
heterogenous farmers and we examine analytically how di￿erences in pest attacks across
farms and mobility of pests across farms a￿ect the ranking of the two instruments.
2 Model
We consider a set of 2I ￿ 2 producers facing heterogenous pest attacks. This set is
denoted ￿ = 1;:::;2I ￿ 2. Producers are located on a circle, according to their ranking
(i.e. for every i 2 f2;::;2I ￿3g, producer i has neighbors i￿1 and i+1, and producers
1 and 2I ￿ 2 are neighbors). Producer i faces an intensity of pest attacks ni. To avoid
edge e￿ects, we assume that ni is non-decreasing in i on the ￿rst half of the circle (i.e.
ni+1 ￿ ni for every i 2 f1;:::;Ig), and non-increasing in i on the second half of the
circle with a symmetric distribution of ni on both halves of the circle (i.e. n2I￿i = ni
for every i 2 f2;:::;I ￿ 1g). Moreover, we assume that maxi2f1;:::;Ig ni = nI ￿ 1. Each
producer has a ￿xed area of land that is planted either with a pest-resistant variety
(latter denoted as \pesticide variety") or with a conventional variety that shows no
resistance to the pest considered. Although resistance buildup is a dynamic problem
in essence, we summarize here its cumulated e￿ect over time in a one-period problem.
Such a simple formalization allows to capture the e￿ect of pest dispersion at the long
run when producers make an initial crop variety choice and stick on it.
In the absence of pest attacks, the unit pro￿t on the conventional variety is assumed
constant and normalized to 1. All pests survive and cause crop damages on the conven-
tional variety. Pro￿t losses caused by pest attacks of intensity ni are equal to ni.1 The
pesticide variety is available with an overcost c compared to the conventional variety
1For simpli￿cation matters we do not consider the possibility of applying a chemical pesticide on the
area sown with the conventional variety.
3(i.e. the cost of the conventional variety is normalized to 0). This cost will be kept
constant in our analysis (in other words, we do not consider any strategic behavior from
the suppliers of this technology in this paper). Only resistant pests survive to cause
crop damages on the pesticide variety. The producer’s unit pro￿t at location i takes the
form:
￿i(xi;wi;ni) = xi(1 ￿ niwi ￿ c) + (1 ￿ xi)(1 ￿ ni); (1)
where xi is the proportion of area planted with a pesticide variety and wi is the average
long run level of resistant pests.2
The proportion of resistant pests at farm i depends on the other farmers’ planting







where ￿i￿j = ￿j￿i captures the impact of producer j’s crop on resistance at i and ￿
quanti￿es the magnitude of resistance development, with 0 < ￿ < 1. We assume ￿j ￿ ￿k
for j < k. This assumption implies that a producer’s impact on resistance at another
location is decreasing with the distance. ￿0 captures the impact of a producer on its
own resistance level.
A pest resistance management strategy (PRM) fxig is a set of pesticide area pro-
portions xi for every producer i = 1;:::;I. In what follows, we successively examine the
e￿cient PRM strategy, denoted fx￿
ig, and the equilibrium PRM strategy, denoted fxe
ig,
in the general case and then for speci￿c assumptions on pest dispersion.
3 Optimal and producers’ PRM strategy
We ￿rst consider the optimal strategy at the collective level, assuming that the welfare





j2￿ ￿i(xi;wi;ni), subject to: 8xi 2 X; xi 2 [0;1].
2Immediate observation shows that: @￿i=@xi = ni(1 ￿ wi) ￿ c ; @￿i=@wi = ￿nixi; @￿i=@n =
￿xiwi ￿ (1 ￿ xi). Given the level of resistance wi, the unit pro￿t level at location ni increases with
the resistant area proportion if and only if the additional number of pests that are controlled by the
resistant technology, i.e. the number of susceptible pests, ni(1 ￿ wi), is higher than the unit cost of
the resistant technology, c. Given any positive pest-resistant area xi, the unit pro￿t level at location i
decreases with the level of resistance wi, as pest control then decreases on the resistant area. And for
a given level of resistance and a given resistant area proportion, the unit pro￿t level decreases with the
intensity of pest attacks.
4Denote ￿￿
i and ￿ ￿￿
i the multipliers associated to the respective constraints xi ￿ 0 and
xi ￿ 1, for any xi for i 2 ￿. For every i, the solution fx￿
ig to the above program satis￿es
the following ￿rst-order condition:
ni(1 ￿ w￿
i) + ￿￿









with the complementarity slackness conditions
￿￿
i ￿ 0 x￿




i ￿ 0 x￿
i ￿ 1 ￿ ￿￿
i(1 ￿ x￿
i) = 0:
Equation (3) equalizes the marginal bene￿t of the pesticide variety (left-hand side) to its
marginal cost (right-hand side) net of the shadow costs of the constraints. The marginal
cost of pesticide variety includes the impact of i’s area of the pesticide variety on its own
resistance level wi (formally @wi
@xi ) as well as on resistance levels wj of other producers
j 6= i, i.e.
@wj
@xi .
Let us now examine the PRM strategy of producers without regulation. The program
of producer i is maxxi ￿i(xi;wi;ni), subject to xi 2 [0;1]. Denoting ￿e
i and ￿ ￿e
i the











with the complementarity slackness conditions:
￿e
i ￿ 0 xe




i ￿ 0 xe
i ￿ 1 ￿ ￿e
i(1 ￿ xe
i) = 0
Here too, each producer equalizes the marginal bene￿t of pesticide variety (left-hand
side) to its marginal cost (right-hand side) net of the shadow cost of the constraints.
However, since the producer incurs only the cost of the PRM strategy on its own pro￿t,
he ignores the impact of his PRM strategy on his neighbor’s pro￿ts. Therefore, in
contrast to the optimal PRM strategy, the right-hand term in (4) includes only the
impact of i’s PRM strategy on his pro￿t, not on the other producers’ pro￿ts.
Substituting for the partial derivatives, the ￿rst-order conditions (3) and (4) become
ni(1 ￿ w￿
i) + ￿￿





















k2￿ ￿j￿knk for every j 2 ￿. From condition (5) it appears clearly that
the optimal PRM strategy X￿ depends on pest dispersion rates ￿j￿k for every k 2 ￿.
Condition (6) shows that a producer i’s PRM strategy depends on its pest attack ni, the
equilibrium resistance level we and on the impact of its PRM decision on its resistance
level, namely ￿ni
￿0
Di. We will be able to formulate explicitly fx￿g and fxeg for extreme
assumptions on dispersion rates in Sections 4 and 5.
4 Immobile pests
As a benchmark, we ￿rst consider the case of no externalities between producers. We
assume ￿0 > 0 and ￿t = 0 for t 6= 0: the resistance level at one location depends only
on the PRM strategy at this location. In other words, pests are immobile from one














which is equivalent to the producer’s ￿rst-order condition (4) for every i 2 ￿. Since the
resistance level at i depends only on producer i’s PRM strategy, each producer i has an
incentive to select the e￿cient PRM strategy at i, i.e., xe
i = x￿
i for every i 2 ￿. In other
words, the equilibrium \laissez-faire" situation is optimal. No regulation for resistance
management is warranted.
Substituting for the partial derivative and the value of w￿




i = c + ni￿x￿
















When no constraint is binding, i.e. ￿￿
i = ￿ ￿￿
i = 0, then x￿
i = 1
2￿(1￿ c
ni). The area planted
with the pesticide variety is increasing in the intensity of pest attacks ni. It is decreasing
in the pesticide variety overcost c and in the magnitude of resistance development ￿. If
the lower bound constraint of e￿ciency program is binding then x￿
i = 0, ￿￿
i > 0 and
6￿ ￿￿
i = 0. Condition (8) shows that it implies ni < c. The upper bound constraint is
binding for 1
2￿(1 ￿ c
ni) > 1, which yields ￿ < 1
2 and ni > c
1￿2￿. We have proved the
following results.
Proposition 1 With immobile pests, the producer’s PRM strategies are e￿cient. As-
suming that ￿ < 1
2 and nI > c
1￿2￿, they are de￿ned as follows.
a. All producers i facing pest attacks ni ￿ c plant only the conventional variety.





plant both the conventional
variety and the pesticide variety, and for these producers the pesticide area proportion
x￿
i increases with i.
c. All producers i facing pest attacks ni > c
1￿2￿ plant only the pesticide variety.
When pests are only mobile inside of each farmer’s production area, the pest suscepti-
bility to the pesticide variety is a resource owned privately by each producer. Therefore,
each producer takes into account the e￿ect of its varietal choice on the evolution of
resistance. The pesticide variety is not pro￿table for producers facing low pest attacks,
i.e. for whom ni ￿ c, because the gains it procures in terms of increased pest control
do not outweigh its additional technology cost. On the opposite, the pesticide variety is
pro￿table for producers facing high pest attacks, i.e. for whom ni > c. Whether or not
all these producers ￿nd it pro￿table to plant also the conventional variety on some part
of their acreage (with this area acting as a refuge to decrease the level of resistance)
then depends on the magnitude of ￿, i.e. the magnitude of resistance development due
to pesticide variety plantings.
5 Perfectly mobile pests
In the extreme case of perfectly mobile pest (or uniform pest dispersion) then ￿t =












The ￿rst-order condition of the e￿cient PRM strategy (5) becomes:
ni(1 ￿ w￿) + ￿￿






j + ￿ ￿￿
i; (9)
7whereas the ￿rst-order condition of the equilibrium PRM strategy (6) yields:
ni(1 ￿ we) + ￿e




i + ￿ ￿e
i (10)








i . With perfectly mobile pests, distances between producers
do not matter: only pest attack intensities nj do. They are normalized by the overall
intensity N.
The next proposition describes and compares the e￿cient and equilibrium PRM
strategies. It highlights the ine￿ciency of the "laisser faire" PRM strategy with mobile
pests.
Proposition 2 With perfectly mobile pests, we have:
a. The e￿cient PRM strategy requires that producers ni < n￿ plant only the conven-
tional variety while producers ni > n￿ plant only the pesticide variety, with n￿ = c
1￿2w￿.
b. Producers plant only the conventional variety for ni ￿ ne
1, both varieties (with
resistant area proportion xe
i increasing with ni) for ni 2 (ne
1;ne
2), only the pesticide







1 ￿ we ￿
q







c. n￿ > ne
1.
Since vulnerability to pest increases moving along the two halves of the circle of
producers, the optimal PRM strategy divides producers into two neighbor groups: those
more vulnerable to pests, who should plant only the pesticide variety, and the others
who should rely on the conventional one.3 Since pests are perfectly mobile, distance does
not a￿ect the impact of producers’ planting strategies on resistance at other locations.
There is no cost of concentrating the pesticide variety is one area and the conventional
variety in another. The pesticide variety is thus optimally planted where it is the most
useful.
In the "laisser faire" equilibrium, producers who use the pesticide seed are also
those more vulnerable to pests. Among those producers, some create a refuge zone by
themselves to reduce resistance. This is because their own PRM strategy impacts the
level of pest resistance in their ￿eld. They devote part of their area to the conventional
variety when the bene￿t of this PRM strategy outweighs its cost. The last result of
Proposition 2 shows that producers whose pest attacks range between ne
1 and n￿ plant
3Notice that producers facing pest attacks n
￿ if they exist might choose any strategy xi.
8the pesticide variety while it is e￿cient to plant the conventional one. This is due to
the common property nature of pest resistance which gives an incentive to overuse the
pesticide variety.
We now compare further the e￿cient and equilibrium outcomes with perfectly mobile
pests, assuming that each producer has a in￿nitely small impact on pest resistance w. It
might be so because each producer owns a very small area in this agricultural region (I
tends to in￿nity). Or, alternatively, producers might by myopic regarding their impact
on resistance w. Formally, this means @wi
@xi = 0 in the equilibrium ￿rst-order condition
(4), or, that ni
N tend to 0 in the ￿rst-order condition (10), which becomes:
ni(1 ￿ we) + ￿e
i = c + ￿ ￿e
i:
In this case, it is straightforward to show (as in proof of Proposition 2) that the threshold
ne ￿ c
1￿we divides the segment of producers between those whose pest attacks are lower
than ne (who plant only the conventional variety) and the others (who plant only the
pesticide variety). Due to the in￿nitesimal impact of each producer’s PRM strategy on
resistance, no producer creates a refuge zone. Nevertheless, the area including producers
with pest attacks lower than ne acts as a refuge area for the other producers. With
perfectly mobile pests, it reduces resistance equally everywhere. But it is not planted for
pest resistance management purposes. It is just planted because at these locations pest
attack intensity is too low to outweigh the overcost of pesticide variety. In particular,
no producer plants the conventional seed if ne ￿ n1.
Clearly, n￿ > ne. Producers facing pests attacks between ne and n￿ plant only
the pesticide variety but should use only the conventional one. As a consequence, the
resistance level is too high: we > w￿. Proposition 3 below posits a regulatory instrument
that restores e￿ciency.
Proposition 3 When each producer’s impact on resistance is negligible, producers fac-
ing pests attacks n1 up to ne plant the conventional variety whereas those facing pests
attacks higher than ne plant the pesticide variety. E￿ciency can be restored with a tax




nj, which induces producers fac-
ing pest attacks ne up to n￿ to turn to the conventional variety. Uniform refuge zones
do not allow to restore e￿ciency.
The equilibrium PRM strategy is ine￿cient because producers do not bear the full
cost of planting the pesticide variety on producer’s pro￿ts through pest resistance de-
velopment. A tax on the pesticide variety increases the overcost of planting this variety.
The proposed tax ￿ equalizes this overcost to the pro￿t loss of all producers due to the
9increase of resistance development. It provides producers with an incentive to select
seed varieties e￿ciently. The resistance level is thus e￿cient.
6 Imperfectly mobile pests with homogeneous pest attack
In the previous sections, we have considered successively two extreme assumptions.
First, we have assumed no pest mobility so that pest resistance developed in one farm
has no impact its neighborhood. Second, we have assumed perfect pest mobility so that
resistance developed at any location is perfectly di￿used elsewhere in this region. In this
section, we consider a more realistic but more complex assumption on imperfect mobility
of pests across farms. On the other hand, to obtain tractable results, we simplify the
analysis by assuming homogeneous vulnerability to pests. Formally, we assume that
￿t > ￿t+1 for every t but yet ni = ni+1 = n. In this case of imperfect mobility but
















The ￿rst-order condition of the e￿cient PRM strategy (5) writes
n(1 ￿ w￿
i) + ￿￿
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i = c + nw￿
i + ￿ ￿￿
i;



























































for every i 2 ￿.
It is immediate that e￿cient and equilibrium resistance levels and proportions of





i = xe for every i 2 ￿.
We now investigate the implementation of an e￿cient PRM strategy in equilibrium
through regulation. We focus on the case where it is e￿cient to plant both the conven-
tional and the pesticide variety at each location (i.e. the case where ￿￿
i = ￿ ￿￿
i = 0 for








First, a mandatory refuge regulation restores e￿ciency. Suppose that producers
are obliged to plant at most a proportion x￿ with the pesticide variety. Expecting a
resistance equilibrium level w￿, i would like to plant xe
i = K
2￿￿0(1 ￿ c
n) > x￿ with the
pesticide variety and thus would reach the upper bound x￿.
Second, a tax ￿ on the pesticide variety yields an equilibrium PRM strategy (assum-












It restores e￿ciency if there exists a tax level ￿ that achieves xe
i = x￿ if we
i is replaced










It is strictly positive because K > ￿0 and n > (1 ￿ w￿)n ￿ c (the marginal bene￿t of
the pesticide variety exceeds its overcost). It achieves xe
i = x￿ only if ￿0
K > 0, i.e. if
each producer has a non-negligible impact on resistance. We thus have established the
following result.
Proposition 4 With imperfectly mobile pests and homogeneous producers, equilibrium
refuge zones are sub-optimal. E￿ciency can be restored by uniform mandatory refuges.
It can also be restored by a tax on the pesticide variety, unless each producer’s impact
on resistance is negligible.
11Condition (11) shows that it is the case when the constraints are not binding,
i.e. when i is such that ￿￿
i = ￿ ￿￿








n) for one k at least. Then (11) and
the slackness conditions show that ￿ ￿￿
k = 1 and x￿
k = 1. Due to the symmetry of the







which is equivalent to n(w￿
i ￿ w￿
k)(1 + x￿
i) ￿ 0. It implies w￿
i ￿ w￿
k which contradicts
our starting assumption w￿
k > w￿





n). Hence, we have shown that the optimal resistance level
is the same w￿ everywhere. It is equal to w￿ = 1
2(1 ￿ c
n) if no constraints are binding.
In this case, since x￿
i = x￿ for every i 2 ￿, then w￿ = ￿x and, therefore, x￿ = 1
2￿(1￿ c
n).
Otherwise, either all the upper bound constraints are binding, and then x￿
i = 1 for every
i 2 ￿ and w￿ = ￿. Or all the lower bound constraints are binding and then to x￿
i = 0
for every i 2 ￿ and w￿ = 0.
7 Conclusion
We show that the e￿cient management of pest resistance can be achieved (i) with
mandatory refuges if farmers face identical pest attacks or if pests are not mobile across
farms, (ii) with a tax/subsidy scheme if farmers face heterogeneous pest attack and pest
are perfectly mobile.
The case of heterogeneous pest attacks and imperfectly mobile pests is left for future
research. Simulations will be used to study this case, for which results are theoretically
undetermined. For this last case, we expect the optimal regulation instrument to de-
pend on the degree of pest mobility. If pest are highly mobile, thereby moving across
heterogeneous farms, we expect that a tax/subsidy regulation type is more appropri-
ate. Otherwise, mandatory refuges are likely to be better instruments to manage pest
resistance e￿ciently.
A conclusion of this paper is that the market-based management fee strategy of
common property resources may be dominated by the command-and-control refuge rule
in this model with imperfect dispersion rates of pests. Therefore, the usual preference
for market-based environmental instruments (Baumol et Oates 1988, Kolstad 2000) does
not necessarily apply to pest resistance management, because the state of the common-
pool resource does not depend on global but rather on local exploitation rates.
Beyond our speci￿c case of pest resistance management, our paper sheds a new light
on the choice of environmental instruments for the management of other common-pool
resources whereby localisation and dispersion are important, such as biodiversity in
forests (Chomitz 2004) or ￿sheries (Janmaat 2005).
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9 Appendix
9.1 Proof of Proposition 2





jnj, the ￿rst order conditions (9) become:
ni(1 ￿ w￿) + ￿￿
i = c + niw￿ + ￿ ￿￿
i; (13)
for i = 1;:::;I. De￿ne n￿ ￿ c
1￿2w￿. If the lower bound constraint xi ￿ 0 is binding,
then ￿￿
i > 0, x￿
i = 0 and ￿ ￿i = 0 which, combined with (13), imply that ni < n￿.
13Symmetrically, if the upper bound constraint is binding, then ￿￿
i = 0, ￿ ￿i > 0 and x￿
i = 1
and, thus, ni > n￿.
b. In (10), if the lower bound constraint xi ￿ 0 is binding, then ￿e
i > 0, xe
i = 0
and ￿ ￿e
i = 0, which implies that ni < c
1￿we ￿ ne
1. If the upper bound xi ￿ 1 is binding,
then ￿e
i = 0, ￿ ￿e
i > 0 and xe
i = 1, which implies that
￿
Nn2
i ￿ ni(1 ￿ we) + c < 0.
Assuming that (1 ￿ we)2 >
4￿c
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ni). Suppose that n￿ ￿ ne







nj. Therefore, from the above de￿nitions of w￿ and we, w￿ ￿ we.
Second, by de￿nition, it is equivalent to c
1￿2w￿ ￿ c
1￿we, which implies w￿ < we. Thus the
starting assumption n￿ ￿ ne
1 leads to two contradicted consequences, namely w￿ ￿ we
and w￿ < we, which shows that the reverse assumption must hold.
9.2 Proof of Proposition 3
A tax ￿ > 0 on the pesticide variety increases its overcost to c + ￿. The equilibrium
￿rst-order condition (4) with wi = w and @w
@xi = 0 becomes
ni(1 ￿ we) + ￿e
i = c + ￿ + ￿ ￿e
i: (14)
The threshold level ne is de￿ned by the ￿rst-order condition (14) when ￿e
i = ￿ ￿e
i = 0:
ne(1 ￿ we) = c + ￿: (15)
Producers with ni < ne satisfy (14) with ￿e
i > 0 and ￿ ￿e
i = 0 and thus select xe
i = 0.
Those with ni < ne satisfy (14) with ￿e
i = 0 and ￿ ￿e
i > 0 and therefore choose xe
i = 1.
Besides, we know from Proposition 2 that the e￿cient threshold satis￿es
n￿(1 ￿ 2w￿) = c
The above equality and equation (15) show that a tax implements the optimal outcome,
formally ne = n￿ and therefore ne = n￿, for ￿ = n￿w￿ =
P
j2￿;nj￿n￿
nj.
14